Towards A Definition of “Partial Universalism“: The Objection of John Ferejohn and Debra Satz to the Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory

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cris.sourceIdoai:journals.unwe.bg:article/1212
dc.creatorDobreva, Hristinaen
dc.date2022-12-19
dc.date.accessioned2026-09-24T23:19:39Z
dc.date.available2026-09-24T23:19:39Z
dc.descriptionThe paper compares and tries to find a common ground between two camps, proposing different interpretations on the notion of “partial universalism” as opposed to unlimited universalism in rational choice theory. The explanation preferring different theoretical approaches in a complex environment of blurred boundaries is juxtaposed with the explanation of a two-level hypothesis: rational and intentional, where the “weak” additional independent hypothesis is also tested for rationality. The need for a synthesis in the first case is compared to the need of a situational/context dependent causal mechanism, avoiding circular causality. The pragmatic common ground is the improvement of rational choice methodology.en
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://yb.unwe.bg/index.php/yb/article/view/1212
dc.identifier10.37075/YB.2022.2.08
dc.identifier.urihttps://ds.e-dnrs.org/handle/123456789/2000
dc.languageen
dc.publisherAcademic Publishing UNWE (AP-UNWE)en
dc.relationhttps://yb.unwe.bg/index.php/yb/article/view/1212/1203
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2022 Hristina Dobreva (Author)en
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0en
dc.sourceYearbook of UNWE; No. 2 (2022); 95-101en
dc.subjectRational choice theoryen
dc.subjectPartial universalismen
dc.subjectA10 - Generalen
dc.subjectY80 - Related Disciplinesen
dc.titleTowards A Definition of “Partial Universalism“: The Objection of John Ferejohn and Debra Satz to the Pathologies of Rational Choice Theoryen
dc.typePeer-reviewed Articleen

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